Hamas in Power - A Hick-up in Peace

(Created January 28)

Hamas' January election victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections has left many analysts baffled and still asking questions: Is it a revolution in the region? Is it the end of Fatah, considered the more moderate voice of Palestinians? And most importantly, is it the end of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians? The answer to all three questions is a probable 'No'. In order to see why, we must analyze the reasons for which Hamas has won the elections and their implication on its future course of action.

Hamas has won the recent Palestinian elections based on three platforms: non-recognition of Israel and its destruction, the fight in corruption and an end to the lawlessness. Many would be surprised to know that the first of these platforms, the destruction of Israel, was not a major contributor to this victory; and with Palestinian focus on the other two platforms, Hamas has a lot to be fearful of.

Destroying Israel was not a major theme in Hamas' campaign. Many Palestinians are tired of the conflict and many of them depend on trade with Israel or work in it. They know that a prolonged conflict would only cost them more in the long run. That is the reason Hamas has somewhat toned down its Israel rhetoric, but did not abandon it. It did not abandon it because like Arafat, it too depends on its past for its political ascendance to such a degree it cannot simply walk away. So with this in mind we must ask ourselves, what was it in the campaign that brought Hamas to power if not the destruction of Israel? The answer to that lays in the other two campaign promises that cause great concern in Hamas.

It is no great secret that the Palestinian authority under Fatah was corrupt. Billions of dollars allocated to a population about the size of Toronto over a period of 5 years should have built way more infrastructure than the two sides destroyed in their conflict. So Hamas campaigned on fighting corruption; but campaigning is easier than delivering and Hamas knows it. The Palestinian people will not settle for a simple declaration or proof that corruption is over. For them the only proof that corruption has ended would be an improvement in their low living standards which Hamas has skillfully blamed on Fatah's corruption; and as noted earlier, that improvement cannot occur without access to the Israeli economy. Furthermore, as armed wings are going to demand their share of the power's money, the situation will deteriorate even further into Hamas' third promise and biggest concern, lawlessness.

Hamas' campaign against lawlessness is a peculiar thing, particularly since it is its main creator as a part of a build up towards this moment since Arafat's death. Fatah- filled security forces have been unable to control loose gunmen, mostly backed up by Hamas. Now with Hamas in power, it is going to be its men that will fill the security forces, while Fatah's people are going to cause trouble using the same tactics as Hamas; and Hamas knows it. Once Fatah's armed groups start their turn as the lawlessness' creators, Hamas will not be able to fulfill its third and most crucial promise – an end to lawlessness.

For all these reasons, what has occurred in the Palestinian authority is not a revolution; it is simply a signal to Fatah to mend its ways by the time Hamas fails and Hamas knows it[1]. That is why as soon as Hamas won the clear majority, they offered Fatah something no western party that wins such a majority offers its rival: a power share. Hamas' representatives need Fatah for international recognition so the money does not stop and so they can deliver on their promises of better life and appear less corrupt; they need Fatah to talk to Israel so access remains open to Israeli markets; but most importantly, they need Fatah so it does not teach Hamas a lesson in its own tactics of overthrowing a government through lawlessness. Thus, knowing what all this means in terms of revolution or the end of Fatah, we can turn and ask the most crucial of questions – the peace process.

In terms of the peace process, this is not the end. Unfortunately, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that this is a major hick-up. It is ironic that Palestinian politics imitate so well what happens in Israeli politics. In Israeli politics, the left, often referred to as the peace camp, has failed to deliver (Barak), bringing the then hard-line right (Sharon). The hard-line right failed to deliver and so, as former Israeli Education minister Amnon Rubinstein has noted, started turning to the left's policies (withdrawal). That brought in a crisis in the right that led to a break up in ideology (Kadima). And now we have a chance for peace. Superimposing this model on the Palestinians, they are in the first stages. The moderate left has failed to deliver (Fatah) so the hard-line right is rising to power (Hamas). Continuing this model further, Hamas and the Palestinian public will realize this does not work (especially facing continuing international pressure which is crucial for the realization of this model). Following that, there will be a break up in ideology and the only difference might be in what happens next: either Fatah will regain power, or we will see a centrist force comprised of moderate pragmatic people on both sides, similar to Kadima's case. Whatever the result of that might be, it will be then that this hick-up in peace will be over. This writer is only left with hoping that this hick-up on the Palestinian side would not destroy Israel's newly found pragmatism as similar moves have affected past Israeli elections[2]; and that this hick-up would not take 5 years and 5000 casualties on both sides, as it did in Israel's case.



[1] Fatah has already caught on to this point. In a 2004 survey 90% of Palestinians believed the PA was corrupt; in a recent 2005 survey, 60% have supported this notion, a decline of 30 percentage points in one year. Despite that, Abu-Mazen's actions since the death of Arafat have been too little too late
[2] For a correlation between Israeli public conciliatory approach and sense of security see: Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003 (Jafee Centre for Strategic Studies: 2003). For a complete picture see also previous surveys.