Meanwhile, in the Palestinian scene...

Recent events in Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear program, have pushed the Palestinian-Israeli issue aside. Readers of this site know it, the world knows it, Israelis know it and most importantly Palestinians know it. This break in global attention is perhaps the best time to jumpstart a sort of a process based on a few principles, in which no side will try to gain PR points over the other; but would truly mean what it says.

The Israeli Palestinian process is currently in a sort of a magic circle. Chairman Abu Mazen has no political power (and for that matter neither does the Hamas government vis-a-vis its members abroad) and so Cpl. Gilad Shalit is kidnapped. Olmert has to do something about it and the only thing he can do other than blast Gaza to kingdom calm is to talk to Abu Mazen who has no political power and will not have one till Olmert gives him some through some gestures. But without the release of Cpl. Shalit, Olmert is politically incapable of giving such gestures, especially considering the tremendous amount of gestures he has already given in the Lebanese scene to no avail. So what can be done?

The lack of media attention might provide the two leaders a brief breather. None of them can afford to lose; and none of them can win at the moment. For Olmert, a prisoner exchange at the moment would seem like a defeat: all this military operation and nothing to show for it other than the initial solution. For Abu Mazen, well, he has no achievments to show for gaining the people's support; but he could use the declining support in Gaza for the holding of Cpl. Shalit.

And so the two, Olmert and Abu Mazen can negotiate an exchange. For Olmert, this might be a bit too late to save himself in the harsh Israeli political wilderness. But if he wants to do anything memorable before he goes that would help in the future, it would be to empower Abu Mazen through a peisoner exchange scheme that would make it clear who was it that negotiated this relief for Palestinians (Abu Mazen, not Hamas). At the same time, Abu Mazen will have to cooperate on a unity government between Fatah and Hamas (government) that would make sure to reign in on rougue groups including Hamas and Fatah ones. Not doing so will mean that this would be the last ever prisoner exchange. Israel at the same time must follow through on the promises it will make in the exchange and release prisoners. Again, this would require BOTH sides to hold true to their bargain or this will be the abasolute last chance.

While may Palestinians will be relieved to get rid of Cpl. Shalit, their relief must be supplemented by an aleviation of the economic problems in the Gaza strip that would strengthen Abu Mazen. This would lead many Israelis to think "what's in it for us?" and it is here that the Palestinians must provide the goods. If the Israelis get no quiet, then this would be catastrophic. True, Israel will give here a lot more than the Palestinians, but Israelis must remember an important point brought forward by Barak's chief negotiator, Gilad Sher: Israel has all the cards to play with. Palestinians have only one card and it is the one that Israel wants - peace and quiet. It is thus important to get that card as far as Israelis go, and it is important for Palestinians to understand that a negation on yet another promise regarding this card on their part, would mean the Israelis will lose patience and refuse to play any more.

There are definitly no winners in this sort of deal. Every side will feel it gave the most. But what's more important than that, is that there are no losers in it either provided both sides keep their end of the bargain. And that is definitly a plus.