Friday, March 24, 2006

Putin and Hamas - A Mastermind's Game

(Created March 10)

Barbara Walters once interviewed President Putin and asked him the hardest question ever, for which no candid reply could have been given: Did you ever kill anyone or ordered someone killed? The KGB veteran did not lose his nerves and answered: no, never, I was in the political wing of the KGB. That answer, more than anything, can explain Putin's actions regarding Hamas. As usual Putin was doing what he thought would work for Russia.

When Russia broke with the international line of snubbing Hamas, many assumed it was done so Russia can have a bigger role as a mediator in the process. If that was really the intention, and this writer doubts it, it was the wrong way. To be a mediator you must be able to talk to both sides like the Americans: support Israel and give 400 million dollars a year to the Palestinians. Yet Russia has done none of that. Since the beginning of the Intifada it has done all it can to snub the Israelis; whether it was the sale of surface to air missiles to Syria that ended up in Hezbollah's hands, selling nuclear components to Iran's "peaceful" nuclear project or this recent talk to a terrorist organization. These acts have not evaded the eyes of the Israeli government, particularly the talk with Hamas, who pointed out correctly to Putin's double standard with regards to terrorism; a standard that might risk Russia's capability to deal with its own militants in Chechnya in the international arena.

When President Putin came out in Spain and informed the world that Russia does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization and thinks that "calling groups 'terrorists' and burning political bridges is easy", Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz was immediately on the plane to Moscow, to clarify to Putin that "Hamas is Israel's Chechnya". The connection was clear: if Moscow insists that Hamas must be talked to, it must first set an example with the Chechen rebels. President Putin immediately searched for a way to climb down the high tree and found it through the lowering of the levels of the talks and insisting on the Quartet's demands. Hamas' leaders' meeting with Russian foreign minister Levrov, instead of the resident, lasted for only an hour and half with the Russians being the only ones surprised that Hamas was adamant on its demands. Apparently they thought Russia's friendship with the Arab world would help them but it did not. But the question remains: did President Putin not predict this? Did he not predict that Israel would draw the line back to Chechnya? Based on the remark from the opening paragraph, we can surely say he knew what he was doing.

Russia's Muslim community comprises about 14% of Russia's population and is about 20 million strong. It is the largest religious minority in Russia and is generally unhappy with its own situation or that of the rebels in Chechnya who are generally Muslim. Fearing that they might serve as a fifth column inside Russia, and to gain more public support for his vendetta in Chechnya by enlisting his toughest critics, Putin needed Russian Muslim leaders' open support so he can showcase it in Russia and around the Muslim world. Indeed it took less than a day when Russian Muslim leaders published their support for Putin's meeting with Hamas and with no mentioning of Chechnya – for Muslim leaders feared the President might back off his outreach to their Muslim brothers in Hamas. Chechen rebels were alarmed and even published a note condemning Hamas for meeting with the president but it was too late for them - Putin's political checkmate was already in place. When that happened, the former KGB political officer was able to climb down the now not so high tree, and go home happy knowing that he dealt the Chechen's another PR blow, allowing him to continue his ruthless operations there, this time with Muslim implicit support by silence. Indeed, a game worthy of a political mastermind.

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