Continuing Israeli Elections' Fortune Telling: After the Results and Before the Coalitions

As the dust settles on Israeli elections, and with the availability of the final results, it is time to recount the winners and losers of these elections. It is also time to continue with the next phase in this fortune telling story of Israeli elections, the potential coalitions and their effect on the peace process. As my previous post regarding Israeli elections predicted, these elections brought many surprises but very little change. The big parties will still be held hostage by the smaller parties. To see why, it is enough to look at the possible coalitions Mr. Olmert, head of the winning Kadima party, can assemble.

At the moment, Ehud Olmert is facing the possibility of either a left-center or a right center coalition; each with its own advantages and disadvantages. While a left-center coalition enjoys a much more favorable global image as the peace maker, something I will discuss later on, it also "enjoys" much less stability compared with a right-centre coalition.

As the diagram above shows, the left centre coalition is comprised out of a larger share of potentially risky partners, painted in red and represented by the Arab and ultra-orthodox religious parties. The Arab parties face a certain dilemma with regards to a coalition with Kadima. On the one hand, they are trying to maintain their appeal in the Arab world by ascribing to the Palestinian cause; as such they cannot seat in a coalition led by a party founded by Sharon, who the Palestinians regard as a war criminal. On the other hand, Arab members of parliament in recent years have gone under considerable fire from their Arab Israeli voters for giving too much attention to the Palestinian cause rather than their own voters, Arab Israelis. A good example of that was seen by the flow of Arab municipality leaders to Kadima prior to the elections. Arab parties' position in this coalition will only be dictated by the amount of pressure their public will put on them. What is more, once Olmert goes to a unilateral solution as a last resort, something Palestinians strongly object, the Arab parties are likely to withdraw from the coalition.

Ironically, Jewish Ultra-Orthodox parties (Shas and Yahadut Hatorah) face a similar situation from the right wing of the political map. On the one hand they whole heartedly believe in the idea of "the whole of Israel" (Eretz Yisrael Hashlema) and are in constant competition with the national union party who is conservative religious and hard line right. However the Ultra orthodox parties also have to take care of their Ultra orthodox public, considered one of the poorest segments of Israeli society; and as everybody knows, it is hard to take care of your public from the opposition. Still if they join and things get serious as Olmert continues with the withdrawals; it is likely the Ultra orthodox parties will back down. Even if Olmert puts supporting the withdrawals as a precondition for the coalition; supporting the coalition at first and backing off when things get tough is not something unheard of in Israeli politics.

The rest of the parties comprising the left-center coalition, Labor Meretz and the Pensioners, are likely to be stable partners either because they are strong enough as in Labor's case, too small as in Meretz's case, or simply new as in the Pensioners party case. Labor with 20 seats is a backbone for this coalition and Olmert will not risk antagonizing it. As for Meretz their situation was made abundantly clear in their post election gathering. When Yossi Beilin, the head of the party and from the conceivers of the Geneva accords, said that what the party needs to do now is set the conditions for its participation in the coalition; his fellow party members hissed him, telling him to face the reality. With only five seats in parliament, down from six, they are in no position to make any demands.

The situation for the pensioners' party, the biggest surprise of these elections, is different. As a list that has tried to enter the Knesset in previous elections to no avail; and as a party that run on social security and Medicare reforms, they cannot afford to fail. As a result they will stick with whatever foreign policy Olmert sets in order to fulfill their promises; for if they not, these elections may be the first and last parliament they will ever be in. In a sense this is the biggest change in these elections as the potential "king-makers" do not ascribe to this or that foreign policy regarding the peace efforts. And so despite the fact that a left-center coalition has 88 seats, only 61 of them are certain. This is a far cry from the situation in which the right-center coalition is in with 86 seats, 77 of which are certain.

The first change we can see in the right center coalition is that all of a sudden the ultra-orthodox parties have become stable partners as oppose to risky ones in the left centre. This is not as much a matter of different policy as it is of terminology. While at the left center coalition, if Olmert makes concessions, the Ultra orthodox parties will not be able to say to their public that they stood for their principles; in a right-center coalition they will be able to do so by noting that Yisrael Beytenu, led by Netanyahu's director of operations during his term Avigdor Liberman, and the Likud are in the coalition with them; thus creating the image that Shas and Yahadut Hatorah are not the only right wing parties to favor withdrawal.

Likud and Yisrael Beytenu are likely to be stable partners for the same reason Labor is in a left-center coalition, though to a lesser degree. The two of them are smaller than labor but together they are a backbone of this coalition as is Labor in the left center coalition. In order to maintain their validity they will also stay in the coalition so they can deliver things to their voters and point to achievements in the next elections. Those of you who think that by doing so they are betraying their right wing tradition through withdrawals - don't, those times are over.

The division between left and right in Israel has gone through many changes including some ups and downs ever since Begin gave back the Sinai; making the delineation between left and right in Israel much murkier. In the world's view it was always the left that was the peace maker in Israel; this while the right developed its "strong stand for Israel" approach. Yet a close inspection of both sides' records reveals a not so clear a picture. While the Left has given the Palestinians the Oslo accords and the PA that amounted to nothing, while enlarging settlements during Barak's time; the right has so far sacrificed more land for peace. Begin gave back the Sinai with its huge strategic importance for Israel as depth and oil source, Netanyahu gave Hebron and Sharon gave Gaza. And so as this analysis of the right center coalition comes into conclusion, the only party that is truly hard line right is the National Union with 9 seats; representing the only risk for the right center coalition in case of a withdrawal. There is no chance they will remain for their nine seats came from the evicted settlers and they know it. And so looking back at the right-center coalition, essentially it is more stable with 77 stable seats. With the coalition picture complete, we can now turn and complete the second puzzle of the Israeli Palestinian peace process after our previous analysis of Hamas' victory. Is a right-center coalition the one to be in Israel? And if so, will this kill the peace process?

Concerning the coalition to be formed by Olmert, it is likely that he will first attempt a left-center coalition despite its fragileness. That is because of its favorable world image and because it is initially closer to his planned moves; however it all depends on whether the Ultra orthodox and more importantly the Arab parties will stay all the way though. If this does not happen, then the left-center coalition is likely to fall within a year and a half, followed by a right-center coalition who might or might not be led by Kadima. But is this really bad for peace?

It is a known catch phrase in American foreign policy history that "only Nixon could go to China"; meaning that only he was tough enough on communism to be able to talk to China without being considered a communist lover. On the same token only Sharon and the right could make the withdrawals for Israel and perhaps only Hamas can make compromises for the Palestinians without looking as traitors in the eyes of their peoples. If Hamas really wants to avoid bloodshed, it must understand this and moderate itself before the left-center coalition collapses. It will take Olmert a longer time to bring a right center coalition to the negotiations table, though he will do it eventually. At the same time Israeli right-center parties must realize that if Hamas does moderate itself, it would be a good idea to talk to it in order to avoid further bloodshed as well.

Finally, before I conclude, a qualification. The coalition scenarios presented above are only two possibilities out of a much larger range. It could always be that the bigger parties on either left or right might show responsibility and join together in a mystery coalition that will go further than any other, though I wouldn't hold my breath. Israeli politics are full of surprises; just how much we will see in 60 days when Olmert presents his government.