An important article by Al Sharq Al Awsat's Amir Taheri about the connection (or lack of) between British Muslims and Prime Minister Tony Blair. Those in the Palestinian Authority who have called on Blair not to visit the PA should take notes.

Syria: Assad only picks on the weak

President Bashar al-Assad knows he has no military power to take over Israel. As this site has noted before, Hezbollah's "victory" (if we can call the situation in which Lebanon's economy is now in a victory) could only be achieved in a limited guerilla war meant to annoy Israel and nothing more. But when it comes to Lebanon, there Assad playing it as a big-shot because he can. How else could you explain his objection to International observers on the LEBANESE side of the Syrian-Lebanese borders?

If President Assad truly supported his wards about Liberating Lebanon he would know this decision is totally up to the Lebanese government and it only. He also knows that Lebanon would do now anything it can to prevent another war like this including an international force that would serve to try and stop Hezbollah (as if it is possible without a stringer mandate) and Assad cannot have it. He needs them to get him Sheba farms and reinstate Syria in Lebanon following the cedar revolution.

And so the only way he could help Hezbollah is by preventing an international force on the border he uses to resupply Hezbollah. That is why Syria claimed that doing so would be tauntomaunt to a declaration of war by Lebanon on Syria. Strangely enough, an international force on the Syrian-Israeli border is no declaration of war, could it be because he could win easily over Lebanon? And this is what leads me to say that President Assad only picks on those who are weaker then him... just like a bully.

Meanwhile, in the Palestinian scene...

Recent events in Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear program, have pushed the Palestinian-Israeli issue aside. Readers of this site know it, the world knows it, Israelis know it and most importantly Palestinians know it. This break in global attention is perhaps the best time to jumpstart a sort of a process based on a few principles, in which no side will try to gain PR points over the other; but would truly mean what it says.

The Israeli Palestinian process is currently in a sort of a magic circle. Chairman Abu Mazen has no political power (and for that matter neither does the Hamas government vis-a-vis its members abroad) and so Cpl. Gilad Shalit is kidnapped. Olmert has to do something about it and the only thing he can do other than blast Gaza to kingdom calm is to talk to Abu Mazen who has no political power and will not have one till Olmert gives him some through some gestures. But without the release of Cpl. Shalit, Olmert is politically incapable of giving such gestures, especially considering the tremendous amount of gestures he has already given in the Lebanese scene to no avail. So what can be done?

The lack of media attention might provide the two leaders a brief breather. None of them can afford to lose; and none of them can win at the moment. For Olmert, a prisoner exchange at the moment would seem like a defeat: all this military operation and nothing to show for it other than the initial solution. For Abu Mazen, well, he has no achievments to show for gaining the people's support; but he could use the declining support in Gaza for the holding of Cpl. Shalit.

And so the two, Olmert and Abu Mazen can negotiate an exchange. For Olmert, this might be a bit too late to save himself in the harsh Israeli political wilderness. But if he wants to do anything memorable before he goes that would help in the future, it would be to empower Abu Mazen through a peisoner exchange scheme that would make it clear who was it that negotiated this relief for Palestinians (Abu Mazen, not Hamas). At the same time, Abu Mazen will have to cooperate on a unity government between Fatah and Hamas (government) that would make sure to reign in on rougue groups including Hamas and Fatah ones. Not doing so will mean that this would be the last ever prisoner exchange. Israel at the same time must follow through on the promises it will make in the exchange and release prisoners. Again, this would require BOTH sides to hold true to their bargain or this will be the abasolute last chance.

While may Palestinians will be relieved to get rid of Cpl. Shalit, their relief must be supplemented by an aleviation of the economic problems in the Gaza strip that would strengthen Abu Mazen. This would lead many Israelis to think "what's in it for us?" and it is here that the Palestinians must provide the goods. If the Israelis get no quiet, then this would be catastrophic. True, Israel will give here a lot more than the Palestinians, but Israelis must remember an important point brought forward by Barak's chief negotiator, Gilad Sher: Israel has all the cards to play with. Palestinians have only one card and it is the one that Israel wants - peace and quiet. It is thus important to get that card as far as Israelis go, and it is important for Palestinians to understand that a negation on yet another promise regarding this card on their part, would mean the Israelis will lose patience and refuse to play any more.

There are definitly no winners in this sort of deal. Every side will feel it gave the most. But what's more important than that, is that there are no losers in it either provided both sides keep their end of the bargain. And that is definitly a plus.