The Boy Who Cried Colonialism

Today the UN Security Council has called for forces to be sent to Darfur to resolve the human tragedy that occurs there. It will be lucky if anyone answers for many peace activists have made such a venture not very PR friendly to the only countries that can send anything.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq to end the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its allies, peace organizations have dubbed it "imperialist" and "colonialist", ignoring the situation on the ground just as they did during Saddam's 40 year rule. They ignored the fact that a Sunni minority ruthlessly controlled the Shi'ia majority just as they ignore the fact now that if US forces leave prematurily it will be the end of the Sunnis. With such a view is it a wonder that America will not intervene?

Already those voices are on the rise again. Recently I heard a woman in a lecture noting that a friend of her in Darfur told her that there is no genocide taking place there and that the western powers are taking care of their interests again. Similar innuendos have been made once before regarding another place, Rwanda, and we all know what happened there. Not suprisingly these innuendos have been dropped by those who had the most to gain from the world ignoring the situation. And so by continuing these calls against the so-called imperialism or colonialism, we risk having the world powers stop doing what is right and start doing what is PR friendly. We might end up warning about genocide only to recieve an answer that "we are truly sorry and sympathize with the victims but we cannot intervene once more and become the target practice of Human Rights organizations once again". It would be like the boy who cried wolf; or more to the point, the peace activist who cried genocide.

Israeli Elections: It's the Small Parties Game All Over Again

On March 28, Israelis are going to elect a new parliament. 31 lists competing for 120 seats in what is suppose to be the ultimate game of democracy. The question is not who is going to win – Kadima, Sharon's new centrist party, is going to receive the largest number of seats and comprise the coalition and the government – but rather what kind of coalition is Kadima going to build. With 3 large parties, many analysts predict the stakes are going to be different and this time the biggest party is going to rely on another big party; however the question is which one. And as this writer predicts, this question will once again be decided by the small parties.

During Israel's two big parties era (Likud and Labor), the whole matter of the coalition was left to the smaller parties. The head of the party that won out of the two had to please as many small parties as he could for the other big party was just too different ideologically; however today things are different. The two big parties compete with a third party comprised out of the combined ideology of the two extremes. What is more neither of the classic two, as a big party, has sufficient seats to extort the bound-to-win Kadima. Labor with a predicted 20 along with Kadima's 35 predicted seats comes to 55 seats, just short of the 61 needed majority; and Likud with predicted 16 seats comes up to 51 seats – once again short of the needed 61 seat majority. So once again the game will be decided by the small parties and the number of seats they are going to get.

If Kadima is ever to comprise a majority, it will have to include one of the two big parties in addition to the small parties with similar ideology in order to comprise the coalition. The logic is simple: if the majority of the rest of the seats going to smaller parties would be to right wing parties, then Kadima is going to seat in coalition with Likud. If the majority of the small parties' seats are going to go to left wing parties, Kadima is going to seat with Labor.

This simple logic will mean that nothing has changed to a large degree in Israeli politics. Though the number of big parties has increased; it has not increased sufficiently to render the small parties powerless and they will take advantage of that. Once again the small parties are going to take advantage of the situation and demand far reaching benefits for their publics at the expense of others much like Meretz or Shas did. However there is still a chance that something will be different. That difference will only occur if a number of the small unaffiliated lists like the pensioner's party, or green leaf party, will win a sufficient number of seats. Olmert should count his blessings if that ever happens for it means he would not be constrained to choose his big partner according to seats, but rather according to the foreign policy he believes in for the small unaffiliated parties would be too busy with their own agenda to seriously threat a big parties' coalition on foreign policy issues.

Putin and Hamas - A Mastermind's Game

(Created March 10)

Barbara Walters once interviewed President Putin and asked him the hardest question ever, for which no candid reply could have been given: Did you ever kill anyone or ordered someone killed? The KGB veteran did not lose his nerves and answered: no, never, I was in the political wing of the KGB. That answer, more than anything, can explain Putin's actions regarding Hamas. As usual Putin was doing what he thought would work for Russia.

When Russia broke with the international line of snubbing Hamas, many assumed it was done so Russia can have a bigger role as a mediator in the process. If that was really the intention, and this writer doubts it, it was the wrong way. To be a mediator you must be able to talk to both sides like the Americans: support Israel and give 400 million dollars a year to the Palestinians. Yet Russia has done none of that. Since the beginning of the Intifada it has done all it can to snub the Israelis; whether it was the sale of surface to air missiles to Syria that ended up in Hezbollah's hands, selling nuclear components to Iran's "peaceful" nuclear project or this recent talk to a terrorist organization. These acts have not evaded the eyes of the Israeli government, particularly the talk with Hamas, who pointed out correctly to Putin's double standard with regards to terrorism; a standard that might risk Russia's capability to deal with its own militants in Chechnya in the international arena.

When President Putin came out in Spain and informed the world that Russia does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization and thinks that "calling groups 'terrorists' and burning political bridges is easy", Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz was immediately on the plane to Moscow, to clarify to Putin that "Hamas is Israel's Chechnya". The connection was clear: if Moscow insists that Hamas must be talked to, it must first set an example with the Chechen rebels. President Putin immediately searched for a way to climb down the high tree and found it through the lowering of the levels of the talks and insisting on the Quartet's demands. Hamas' leaders' meeting with Russian foreign minister Levrov, instead of the resident, lasted for only an hour and half with the Russians being the only ones surprised that Hamas was adamant on its demands. Apparently they thought Russia's friendship with the Arab world would help them but it did not. But the question remains: did President Putin not predict this? Did he not predict that Israel would draw the line back to Chechnya? Based on the remark from the opening paragraph, we can surely say he knew what he was doing.

Russia's Muslim community comprises about 14% of Russia's population and is about 20 million strong. It is the largest religious minority in Russia and is generally unhappy with its own situation or that of the rebels in Chechnya who are generally Muslim. Fearing that they might serve as a fifth column inside Russia, and to gain more public support for his vendetta in Chechnya by enlisting his toughest critics, Putin needed Russian Muslim leaders' open support so he can showcase it in Russia and around the Muslim world. Indeed it took less than a day when Russian Muslim leaders published their support for Putin's meeting with Hamas and with no mentioning of Chechnya – for Muslim leaders feared the President might back off his outreach to their Muslim brothers in Hamas. Chechen rebels were alarmed and even published a note condemning Hamas for meeting with the president but it was too late for them - Putin's political checkmate was already in place. When that happened, the former KGB political officer was able to climb down the now not so high tree, and go home happy knowing that he dealt the Chechen's another PR blow, allowing him to continue his ruthless operations there, this time with Muslim implicit support by silence. Indeed, a game worthy of a political mastermind.

The Benefits of Having a Texas Cowboy

(Created March 5)

Last week an historical event took place in Lebanon: for the first time since the start of the civil war, all of the 14 fighting factions in Lebanon seat together at the same table to discuss the future of Lebanon. Looking around the table one could see figures like Druze leader Walid Junblat, Sa'ad Hariri – son of the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and yes, even Hezbollah's Sheikh Hassan Nassrallah. Three days into the conference, the event has taken another historic step when all 14 delegates agreed to oust pro-Syrian president Amil Lahoud from office; even Sheikh Nasrallah showed no objection. How do all these events tie to President Bush? It is along story and I am glad you asked, and even happier to answer.

In the 'good old days' of Lebanon under the late Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad, such an event would never have taken place. The late president would have secretly pulled the strings to make sure Syria's 'invitation' to stay in Lebanon remained, thus keeping the vision of greater Syria alive. But those days are gone, and Assad's son Bashar is in power and he is no where near his father's strength. That fact is what started events rolling in the region; events that have culminated with the murder of Rafik Hariri and this recent conference.

It is unclear who killed Rafik Al-Hariri but one thing can be said for certain: Syria had a hand in it for no one in Lebanon even dared to breath without Damascus saying it was ok. The question remains who was it, and two theories come to mind, both of them related to Bush's attempts to convince Bashar Assad to join the 2003 war in Iraq as his father did in 1991. As noted, Bashar was not his father when it came to strength. And so when that happened Bashar declined in accordance with the wishes of the Syrian street. His father might have said 'yes' and have the army take care of dissidents; but Bashar's weakness was apparent to the Syrian generals who helped his dad come to power and they would not have followed Bashar. And so the first theory is that Bashar had a hand in Hariri's killing to show he still carries a punch.

The second theory is probably the more plausible one and relates to Bush's decision to go to war in Iraq. As the Lebanese people saw that as oppose to previous presidents, President Bush has backed himself into full fledged commitment to democracy, they sought to take advantage of it. Demonstrations began calling for Syria to leave; demonstrations that have made Syria look weak, something had to be done. And so it is possible that the generals decided to kill Hariri without Bashar knowing of it in order to show Syria still holds the reigns. If Lebanese reaction would have been quite the way the generals hoped it would be, the next step would have probably been to oust Bashar Al-Assad in the same way his father came to power – through a military coup. But things did not go as planned due to the riots the murder has created and so the question arises: what caused Syrian generals, who have their hands in almost anything that moves in Lebanon, miscalculate the reaction so dearly? The answer lies in Washington; in the connection between the war in Iraq and the Lebanese people.

When the Lebanese people saw that President Bush was serious about Iraq, they decided to take advantage of it for themselves. The calculation was simple: If they call for Syria to leave and Damascus responds with threats, all they will have to do is yell 'democracy in danger!' and the Texas Cowboy would knock on the door as he surely did through UN resolution 1559. This line of thinking is evident through the actions of Walid Junblat, the Lebanese Druze leader who in 2001 drank tea with Bashar, in 2003 said that every US soldier killed in Iraq is a blessing and in 2005 called for Syria to leave saying that he now saw the necessity of the war in Iraq. This also influenced the actions of Hezbollah strong man Hassan Nasrallah, who is dependent on Syria for arms but now had no choice but to oust the puppet president of Lebanon to the dismay of his patrons back in Syria in order to remain popular with the people in Lebanon. Indeed none of this would have happened if there was not a stronger man seating in the White House.

This line of reasoning is not particular to the Lebanese-Syrian case. It continues in Libya who has openly disarmed itself and ceased giving refuge to terrorists; and if that is not enough, it also continues in countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait where women are now allowed to vote and run for elections and even drive! The line also continues in long time ally Egypt where democratic reforms are continuously under way. All these are countries that according to many should have nothing to fear due to their ties to the US and hence no reason to change their ways. But they do have something to fear, just like Syria: a Texas cowboy with a strong commitment to democracy; and that ladies and gentlemen, is the benefit of having a Texas cowboy.

Beware of Hate Mongrels or: Not Everything is Religious

(Created March 5)

The attack on the Church of Annunciation has made it painfully clear that although attacks in the Middle East have a lot to do with religions, not all of them are religiously motivated. That simple fact requires us to beware of those who try to take these unrelated attacks and characterize them as religious even when it is not the case for their own political needs.

On Friday a Jewish father entered with his family to the church and threw firecrackers onto worshipers. Irresponsible political leaders of the Arab community have tried to portray it as a religious attack carried out by Jewish right wing extremists. This only served their interests as they prepared for the March 28 elections in Israel. This prompted me to write this post on religious based attacks. It is important to note the difference between a religious hate based attack and a simple attack in order to better understand events in the Middle East and distinguish the relevant and the irrelevant. I will do so by comparing the attack on the church with the murder of Ilan Halimi, a Jewish cell phone salesman in Paris. In the end, it is my hope that you too will understand the difference. I begin with analyzing the church attack in contrast with the Arab claim that his was a Jewish right wing religiously motivated attack.

A key to that call is that the attackers were Jewish so were they? Not really. The fact is that only the Father, Mr. Habibi, was but his wife and daughter are Christians, so with that defused we can continue.

Was it a religiously motivated attack based on hate? Certainly not. Mr. Habibi and his wife have been having problems with Israeli welfare services that saw them as unfit to have custody of their kids. In a sickening attempt to draw attention to their plight they took their now 20 year old daughter and did whatever could get world attention to their welfare case. Clearly this was not a religion based attack. As Mr. Habibi claimed, he has nothing against Christians and Muslims, He's married to a Christian!

This leaves us with the final question, are Mr. Habibi and his wife right wing extremists attempting a provocation? Again the answer is an unequivocal no. There are Christian evangelists, there are Jewish right wing extremists, but Violet and Haim Habibi are not two of them. This is not the first time the couple has been on Israeli news and the first time helps answer this question. In 2002 during their fight with Israeli child services, Haim and Violet Habibi tried to contact their kids in foster homes despite court order and even threatened the child services representative. As police got involved, the two fled to Arafat's Muqata compound seeking refuge and were welcomed with open arms. From there they were interviewed by Israel's channel 10 saying Arafat is not a terrorist and understands what it is to be humane (a seriously contended proclamation by many right wingers). So clearly this is not what it seems though irresponsible political leaders would like to portray it as such. So if Violet and Haim Habibi's attack is not religious, then what is a religious attack? This is where the French case comes in to set an example.

When Ilan Halimi was kidnapped in January, his captors contacted the family demanding 450,000 Euros. When the family responded that they do not have such money, the response was 'go to synagogue and get it'. Clearly the kidnap and murder here were related to Halimi's being Jewish and to the anti-Semitic stereotype that all Jews have money (I know a couple of Jewish friends who look sadly at their beaten old Taurus when they hear that). Even if Joseph Foufouna, the leader of the gang tried to claim that this was not anti-Semitic and actually was all about money, he would still have to explain why he thought Ilan's family would have money and why he told the family to go to synagogue and get the money. The issue here is the motive.

I will admit it is hard to make the distinction but I believe these two cases make a clear distinction. Halimi's case involved a motive based on stereotypes of a certain religion; Habibi's case on the other hand was based on their attempt to fight authorities in a horrific way. The identity of the attackers has nothing to do with that despite what some irresponsible leaders in the Arab community in Israel try to say. And so I hope that this little demonstration clarifies a thin line that is sometimes very hard to make sense of; a thin line that is too often used by demagogues to distract us from the main issue.

Hamas in Power - A Hick-up in Peace

(Created January 28)

Hamas' January election victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections has left many analysts baffled and still asking questions: Is it a revolution in the region? Is it the end of Fatah, considered the more moderate voice of Palestinians? And most importantly, is it the end of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians? The answer to all three questions is a probable 'No'. In order to see why, we must analyze the reasons for which Hamas has won the elections and their implication on its future course of action.

Hamas has won the recent Palestinian elections based on three platforms: non-recognition of Israel and its destruction, the fight in corruption and an end to the lawlessness. Many would be surprised to know that the first of these platforms, the destruction of Israel, was not a major contributor to this victory; and with Palestinian focus on the other two platforms, Hamas has a lot to be fearful of.

Destroying Israel was not a major theme in Hamas' campaign. Many Palestinians are tired of the conflict and many of them depend on trade with Israel or work in it. They know that a prolonged conflict would only cost them more in the long run. That is the reason Hamas has somewhat toned down its Israel rhetoric, but did not abandon it. It did not abandon it because like Arafat, it too depends on its past for its political ascendance to such a degree it cannot simply walk away. So with this in mind we must ask ourselves, what was it in the campaign that brought Hamas to power if not the destruction of Israel? The answer to that lays in the other two campaign promises that cause great concern in Hamas.

It is no great secret that the Palestinian authority under Fatah was corrupt. Billions of dollars allocated to a population about the size of Toronto over a period of 5 years should have built way more infrastructure than the two sides destroyed in their conflict. So Hamas campaigned on fighting corruption; but campaigning is easier than delivering and Hamas knows it. The Palestinian people will not settle for a simple declaration or proof that corruption is over. For them the only proof that corruption has ended would be an improvement in their low living standards which Hamas has skillfully blamed on Fatah's corruption; and as noted earlier, that improvement cannot occur without access to the Israeli economy. Furthermore, as armed wings are going to demand their share of the power's money, the situation will deteriorate even further into Hamas' third promise and biggest concern, lawlessness.

Hamas' campaign against lawlessness is a peculiar thing, particularly since it is its main creator as a part of a build up towards this moment since Arafat's death. Fatah- filled security forces have been unable to control loose gunmen, mostly backed up by Hamas. Now with Hamas in power, it is going to be its men that will fill the security forces, while Fatah's people are going to cause trouble using the same tactics as Hamas; and Hamas knows it. Once Fatah's armed groups start their turn as the lawlessness' creators, Hamas will not be able to fulfill its third and most crucial promise – an end to lawlessness.

For all these reasons, what has occurred in the Palestinian authority is not a revolution; it is simply a signal to Fatah to mend its ways by the time Hamas fails and Hamas knows it[1]. That is why as soon as Hamas won the clear majority, they offered Fatah something no western party that wins such a majority offers its rival: a power share. Hamas' representatives need Fatah for international recognition so the money does not stop and so they can deliver on their promises of better life and appear less corrupt; they need Fatah to talk to Israel so access remains open to Israeli markets; but most importantly, they need Fatah so it does not teach Hamas a lesson in its own tactics of overthrowing a government through lawlessness. Thus, knowing what all this means in terms of revolution or the end of Fatah, we can turn and ask the most crucial of questions – the peace process.

In terms of the peace process, this is not the end. Unfortunately, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that this is a major hick-up. It is ironic that Palestinian politics imitate so well what happens in Israeli politics. In Israeli politics, the left, often referred to as the peace camp, has failed to deliver (Barak), bringing the then hard-line right (Sharon). The hard-line right failed to deliver and so, as former Israeli Education minister Amnon Rubinstein has noted, started turning to the left's policies (withdrawal). That brought in a crisis in the right that led to a break up in ideology (Kadima). And now we have a chance for peace. Superimposing this model on the Palestinians, they are in the first stages. The moderate left has failed to deliver (Fatah) so the hard-line right is rising to power (Hamas). Continuing this model further, Hamas and the Palestinian public will realize this does not work (especially facing continuing international pressure which is crucial for the realization of this model). Following that, there will be a break up in ideology and the only difference might be in what happens next: either Fatah will regain power, or we will see a centrist force comprised of moderate pragmatic people on both sides, similar to Kadima's case. Whatever the result of that might be, it will be then that this hick-up in peace will be over. This writer is only left with hoping that this hick-up on the Palestinian side would not destroy Israel's newly found pragmatism as similar moves have affected past Israeli elections[2]; and that this hick-up would not take 5 years and 5000 casualties on both sides, as it did in Israel's case.



[1] Fatah has already caught on to this point. In a 2004 survey 90% of Palestinians believed the PA was corrupt; in a recent 2005 survey, 60% have supported this notion, a decline of 30 percentage points in one year. Despite that, Abu-Mazen's actions since the death of Arafat have been too little too late
[2] For a correlation between Israeli public conciliatory approach and sense of security see: Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003 (Jafee Centre for Strategic Studies: 2003). For a complete picture see also previous surveys.

Welcome! or: why I opened this Blog

Hello and welcome to my blog, The Middle East News Addict (quite a mouthful isn't it). This blog, as the name suggests, is the result of my addiction to Middle East news and analysis. I have decided to open it for two reasons. The first is that the amount of analysis piling up in my computer has started to create sever space problems on my hard drive. The second and more important reason, is that this blog is the manifestation of my desire to float my ideas out there and receive comments from other Middle East enthusiasts such as yourself (yes, yes, you who are now reading these lines).

To allow you to learn a little bit about my style and line of thinking, I have added some of my older posts to the blog from before I opened this blog (on stuff that are some what gone but still of interest) including the original date in which they were written. If you get the time I would appreciate your comments on those too.

Finally, although this blog is primarily about the Middle East and related issues, from time to time I will venture into other topics of interest in international relations as they spark my fiery desire to write a comment. This is due to the fact that around the world other issues emerge that bare more than one similarity to the troubles of the Middle East as in my post on water issues and world organizations and also because the Middle East is not the only thing happening in international relations.

Enjoy the reading and even more the commenting,

Yours
The Middle East News Addict

p.s.
This is my first blog so I would also appreciate your comments with regards to style as well.